# THE MEDICAL EXPANSION, LIFE-EXPECTANCY AND ENDOGENOUS DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE

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June 02, 2023 III Catalan Economic Society Congress Barcelona

### Motivation and Research Objective

- Facts: Three Phases of Health and Medical Development
  - 1. Life Expectancy at Age 20 flat until about 1840.
  - 2. Life Expectancy at Age 20  $\uparrow$  since about 1840.
  - Emergence of Modern Health Sector ca. 1920-40: Investment ↑, Employment Share ↑, R&D Share ↑, Price of Health Goods ↑

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- Objective: Quantitative theory, predict future, evaluate policies
- Building Blocks:
  - 1. Life Cycle: Diamond (1965)
  - 2. Endogenous Health Investment and Longevity: Grossman (1972)
  - 3. Endogenous Directed Technical Change: Aghion & Howitt (1992)

# **Modeling Approach**

- Households:
  - 2-period lived, endogenous survival in 2nd period.
  - Choices: consumption-savings, health spending.
  - Two health goods: basic hygiene & modern health services.

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  - Two health goods: basic hygiene & modern health services.
- Firms:
  - Two sectors: health goods & final goods
  - Monopolistic competition in intermediate inputs ⇒ Profits
  - Endogenous R&D:  $\Rightarrow$  higher quality intermediates  $\Rightarrow$  Profits.
- Quantitative implementation: Calibration to initial conditions, broad trends in US data.

#### Main Mechanism

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= Kick-off: Basic health spending  $\uparrow$ , life expectancy  $\uparrow$ .

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- Phase 1: Low productivity & Low Income ⇒ No Health Spending.
- Phase 2: Productivity growth in basic goods sector ⇒ Income ↑ => Kick-off: Basic health spending ↑, life expectancy ↑.
- Phase 3: Further income \u03c6, non-homotheticity in health spending:
  - => Health spending  $\uparrow$
  - => Redirection of techn. progress to modern health sector.
  - = Quality in modern health sector  $\uparrow$ , price of health goods  $\uparrow$ .
  - => Convergence to interior BGP.

# **Results Today**

- Stylized Facts
- Construction & calibration of simple, illustrative model.
- Calibrated model results: Model
  - replicates facts qualitatively
  - fits the data quantitatively
- Health Policy reforms: not yet today.

### **Related Literature**

#### Aghion-Howitt meets Grossman meets Diamond

Diamond (1965), Grossman (1972), Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998)

#### Life expectancy, human capital & technological progress

Cervellati & Sunde (2005), Hejkal, Ravikumar & Vandenbroucke (2022)

#### Normative analyses of optimal health & R&D spending shares

Hall and Jones (2007), Jones (2004, 2016)

#### Reasons for growth of health spending

Anderson et al. (2003), Fonseca et al. (2013), Zhao (2014), Hollingsworth et al. (2022)

#### Health spending, R&D & feedback

Frankovic and Kuhn (2018a,b), Böhm et al. (2018)

# Outline

Introduction

#### Facts

#### Economic Model

- Households Firms
- Equilibrium

#### **Calibration and Results**

#### Conclusion

# Remaining Life Expectancy at Age 0



#### Kick-off after 1850

Source: Historical Life Expectancy Data (Haines, Hacker 2010), Human Life-Table Database, Human Mortality Database.

# Remaining Cohort Life Expectancy at Age 20



Increased life expectancy at age 20: Takeoff about 1840.

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# Cohort Life Expectancy: Kick-Off I



Increased life expectancy at age 20: Takeoff ca. 1840.

Source: Hacker (2010), Human Life-Table Database.

# Cohort Life Expectancy: Kick-Off II



Remaining cohort LE slightly

- concave at age 20
- convex at age 60: importance of modern health goods?

Source: Human Life-Table Database, Human Mortality Database.

# Per Capita Income Growth



Per capita income (log scale) started increasing in about 1820

Constant growth at about 2% annually

# Health Expenditure & Output Share



- Health expenditure share ↑
- Output share ↑ since WW.II
- Widespread use of penicillin since WW.II

# Health Employment Share



Huetsch/Krueger/Ludwig: Life Expectancy & Techn. Change

# **Relative Price of Health Goods**



Increase of relative price of health goods & services

#### Quality adjustment?

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  - Two final goods sectors: modern health goods & generic consumption goods (includes hygiene & food).
  - ► Both sectors: continuum of intermediate inputs. Imperfect substitution & monopolistic competition ⇒ Profits
  - Endogenous R&D:  $\Rightarrow$  higher quality of intermediates  $\Rightarrow$  Profits.
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- SOE: interest rate  $R_t = R$  exogenous, constant.

• consumption-savings  $(c_{t+1}, s_t)$ , health investment  $(i_t, i_{ht}, i_{ft})$ , given prices  $p_t, R$ .

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- Utility from old-age consumption and survival:

$$\psi(i_t)u(c_{t+1}) = \psi(i_t)\left(\frac{c_{t+1}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + b\right)$$

No suicide condition: *b* sufficiently large (required if  $\sigma \ge 1$ ).

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Health investment quasi-linear in basic, modern health goods:

$$i_t = \eta i_{ht} + (\nu + i_{ft})^{\zeta}$$

• Note that  $\psi'(i_{ht} = i_{ft} = 0) < \infty$  but  $u'(c_{t+1} = 0) = \infty$ .

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Budget constraints:

$$p_t i_{ht} + i_{ft} + s_t := e_t + s_t = w_t + T_t := x_t$$
$$c_{t+1} = Rs_t$$

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 $x_{t+1} > x_t, p_{t+1} < p_t.$ 

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Then there exist time thresholds  $0 < T_1 < T_2 < \infty$  such that

1. Phase 1: 
$$\forall t < T_1$$
:  $i_t = i_{ft} = i_{ht} = 0$ ,  $\psi(i_t) = \psi(0) \& c_{t+1}^o = Rx_t$ .

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2. Phase 2:  $\forall t \in [T_1, T_2)$ :  $i_t = i_{ft} > 0$ ,  $i_{ht} = 0 \& \psi(i_t) > \psi(0)$ . Life expectancy  $\uparrow$ : better basic hygiene, no modern health sector.

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4. BGP w/ constant 
$$\frac{e}{x} = \frac{p \cdot i_h}{x} > 0, \frac{s}{x} > 0, \frac{c}{x} > 0 \& p > 0.$$

### Production Side: Final Goods Production Firms

► Perfectly competitive final goods producers with CRTS technology in both sectors *j* ∈ {*f*, *h*}:

$$y_{jt} = \left(\int_0^1 q_{jit}^{1-\alpha} y_{jit}^{\alpha}\right) I_{jt}^{1-\alpha}$$

- Firms take as given: quality  $q_{jit}$ , prices  $p_{jit}$ ,  $p_{jt}$ .
- Choices: y<sub>jt</sub>, l<sub>jt</sub>, y<sub>jit</sub>

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- Choices: y<sub>jt</sub>, l<sub>jt</sub>, y<sub>jit</sub>
- FOC's for y<sub>iit</sub> delivers inverse demand function for intermediates:

$$p_{jit} = \alpha p_{jt} \left(\frac{q_{jit}I_{jt}}{y_{jit}}\right)^{1-\alpha}$$

### Intermediate Inputs: Monopolistic Competition

- Each variety  $i \in [0, 1]$  is produced by a monopolist.
- ▶ Production function:  $y_{jit} = k_{jit}$ , full depreciation of capital  $k_{jit}$ .
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- Firms take as given: inverse demand function & R.
- Profit maximization:

$$\pi_{jit} = \max_{k_{jit}} \left\{ \left[ p_{jt} \alpha q_{jit}^{1-\alpha} k_{jit}^{\alpha-1} l_{jt}^{1-\alpha} \right] k_{jit} - Rk_{jit} \right\}$$

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Solution: constant markup over marginal cost *R*, positive profits:

$$p_{jit} = rac{1}{lpha} R > R, \quad \pi_{jit} = rac{1-lpha}{lpha} R k_{jit} > 0$$

# Firms: Aggregating the Production Sector

From intermediate goods producers' FOC: For all *i* ∈ [0, 1],

$$\frac{k_{jit}}{q_{jit}}=\frac{k_{jt}}{q_{jt}},$$

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Aggregation in each sector:

$$y_{jt} = k_{jt}^{\alpha} \left( q_{jt} I_{jt} \right)^{1-\alpha}$$

Distribution of income:

$$\boldsymbol{\rho}_{jt}\boldsymbol{y}_{jt} = \left[ (1-\alpha) + \alpha^2 + \alpha(1-\alpha) \right] \boldsymbol{\rho}_{jt}\boldsymbol{y}_{jt} = \boldsymbol{w}_t \boldsymbol{I}_{jt} + \boldsymbol{R}\boldsymbol{k}_{jt} + \pi_{jt}$$

### **R&D Production & Technological Progress**

- R&D entrepreneur per variety i: resources z<sub>jit</sub> on innovation.
- Probability of successful innovation:

$$\phi(\mathbf{z}_{jit}; \mathbf{I}_{jt}, \mathbf{q}_{jit-1}) = \min\left[\frac{\varphi}{\mathbf{I}_{jt}} \left(\frac{\mathbf{z}_{jit}}{\lambda \mathbf{q}_{jit-1}}\right)^{\gamma}, \mathbf{1}\right]$$

- Successful innovation: quality improvement  $\lambda > 1$  so that  $q_{jit} = \lambda q_{jit-1}$ .
- Successful innovator: one period monopolist for *i*: Profits π<sub>jit</sub>.

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- R&D entrepreneur's problem:

$$\max_{\mathbf{Z}_{jit}} \left\{ \pi_{jit} \cdot \phi(\mathbf{Z}_{jit}; \mathbf{I}_{jt}, \mathbf{q}_{jit-1}) - \mathbf{Z}_{jit} \right\}$$

Solution  $z_{jit} = \Phi(R, p_{jt}, I_{jt})\lambda q_{jit-1}$ .

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Varieties *i* w/ unsuccessful innovations: quality q<sub>jit</sub> = q<sub>jit-1</sub>, randomly selected entrepreneur eats profits π<sub>jit</sub>.

# Firms: Aggregation of R&D & Economic Growth

• Since 
$$\frac{z_{jit}}{\lambda q_{jit-1}} = \Phi(R, p_{jt}, l_{jt})$$
 constant across *i*:

$$\mu_{jt} = \frac{\varphi}{I_{jt}} \left( \frac{Z_{jit}}{\lambda q_{jit-1}} \right)^{\gamma} = \frac{\varphi}{I_{jt}} \left( \Phi(\boldsymbol{R}, \boldsymbol{p}_{jt}, I_{jt}) \right)^{\gamma}$$

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Quality improvements as engine of growth:

$$q_{jt} = \mu_{jt}\lambda q_{jt-1} + (1-\mu_{jt})q_{jt-1}$$

Growth rate in sector j:

$$g_{jt}=\frac{q_{jt}}{q_{jt-1}}=1+(\lambda-1)\mu_{jt}.$$

Huetsch/Krueger/Ludwig: Life Expectancy & Techn. Change

#### Price & Quality of Health Goods

- Good *f* is the numeraire:  $p_{ft} = 1$  for all *t*.
- Relative price of health goods per health efficiency unit i<sub>ht</sub>:

$$p_{ht} =: p_t = \left(\frac{q_{ft}}{q_{ht}}\right)^{1-\alpha}$$

• Relative price, quality adjustment:  $p_t \frac{q_{ht}}{q_t}$ 

#### Balanced Growth Path (BGP) and Transition

- lnterior BGP: quality  $(q_{ft}, q_{ht})$ ,  $x_t, w_t, T_t$  grow at rate g.
- Constant prices  $R, p_t = p$ . Constant shares:

$$\frac{e_t}{x_t} = \frac{p_t i_{ht} + i_{ft}}{x_t} = \frac{p_t i_{ht}}{x_t} = \vartheta, \frac{s_t}{x_t} = 1 - \vartheta, \frac{c_{t+1}}{x_t} = R(1 - \vartheta)$$

▶ BGP with interior share  $\vartheta = \frac{e}{x} \in (0, 1)$  exists iff  $\sigma = 1 + \xi$ .

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- ▶ BGP with interior share  $\vartheta = \frac{e}{x} \in (0, 1)$  exists iff  $\sigma = 1 + \xi$ .
- ► Why? FOC w.r.t.  $\vartheta_t = \frac{e_t}{x_t}$  equates marginal benefit of health spending (longer life) to cost (reduced consumption):

$$\max_{\vartheta_t} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{(1 + i_t(\vartheta_t x_t))^{\xi}} \right) \left( \frac{(Rx_t(1 - \vartheta_t))^{1 - \sigma}}{1 - \sigma} + b \right)$$

For  $(c_{t+1}, e_t)$  to grow at same rate:  $\sigma = 1 + \xi$ .

### Transition to BGP

State of the economy  $(q_{ht-1}, q_{ft-1}, n_t, s_{t-1})$ 

• Given state (&  $R_t = R$ ): static equilibrium, determine  $p_t$  (or  $\frac{l_t}{l_{ht}}$ ).

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- Assumption  $\sigma = 2$ , thus  $\xi = 1$ : closed-form for interior  $\vartheta_t \Rightarrow$

demand for health goods  $\Rightarrow$  update of state  $\Rightarrow$  ( $n_{t+1}$ ,  $s_t$ ).

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demand for health goods  $\Rightarrow$  update of state  $\Rightarrow$  ( $n_{t+1}$ ,  $s_t$ ).

▶ Relative price  $p_t$  determines  $I_{ft}$ ,  $I_{ht}$ ,  $\mu_{ft}$ ,  $\mu_{ht}$ .

• Update of state: 
$$\Rightarrow$$
 ( $q_{ht}, q_{ft}$ ).

# Extensions for Quantitative Analysis

• Labor intensive health sector:  $\alpha_h = 0.22, \alpha_f = 0.33$ . (Acemoglu and

Guerrieri 2008).

- **b** Differential improvement factors:  $\lambda_i$
- Sector-specific parameters: plausible size of both sectors

### Extensions for Quantitative Analysis

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Guerrieri 2008).

- Differential improvement factors:  $\lambda_i$
- Sector-specific parameters: plausible size of both sectors
- ► Key optimality conditions (& requirement for BGP) qualitatively unchanged (still need  $\Rightarrow \sigma = 1 + \xi$ ). Currently  $\sigma = 2$ .

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# **Thought Experiment**

Basic Question: Can the model replicate basic empirical facts?

- Life expectancy at age 20
- Existence & size of modern health sector
- Relative price of health goods

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- Life expectancy at age 20
- Existence & size of modern health sector
- Relative price of health goods
- 40 year model periods: young 20-59, old 59-100
- Six periods: 1820 (phase 1), 1860, 1900 (phase 2),

1940, 1980, 2020 (phase 3).

► Future Question: (Optimal) role of government in health R&D.

#### **Calibration Strategy**

- Value of life b: kick-off of basic health good spending
- Quality gap: kick-off of modern health good spending
- ► IES  $1/\sigma = 0.5$  standard.  $\Rightarrow \xi = 1$ .
- Minimum survival probability: adult remaining life expectancy of 40.2 years in 1790.

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- Minimum survival probability: adult remaining life expectancy of 40.2 years in 1790.
- Growth factor  $\lambda_f$ : overall GDP growth
- Growth factor  $\lambda_h$ : relative growth of modern health sector
- lunovation parameters  $\gamma$ ,  $\varphi$ : relative R&D spending (not yet).

#### **Parameters**

SOE	
Rate of return R-1	1.5 ( $\approx$ 1 % annually)
Initial Condition	
Quality gap $\frac{q_{h0}}{q_{t0}}$	0.027192
Households	
Value of Life b	7.03
IES 1/ $\sigma$	0.5
Tail parameter, survival function $\xi$	1
Min. surv. prob. at i = 0, $\nu^{\zeta}$	0.020669
Scale parameter, modern health investment $\eta$	5
Firms	
Capital elasticities [ $\alpha_{f,1940}$ , $\alpha_{f,2020}$ , $\alpha_{h,1940}$ , $\alpha_{h,2020}$ ]	[0.33,0.33,0.025,0.2]
Growth factor $[\lambda_f, \lambda_h]$	[115,3]
Innovation probability, curvature [ $\gamma_f$ , $\gamma_h$ ]	[0.5,0.5]
Innovation probability, scale $[\varphi_f, \varphi_h]$	[0.5,0.5]

### Determination of BGP: Demand & Supply



Unique BGP equilibrium

Huetsch/Krueger/Ludwig: Life Expectancy & Techn. Change

# Comparison to Data: Log GDP per Capita



Comparison looks good (easy to match)

Huetsch/Krueger/Ludwig: Life Expectancy & Techn. Change

# Transition: Life Expectancy at Age 20



Constant LE prior to kick-off, then increasing.

# Comparison to Data: Health Employment Share



Matches increase qualitatively, but too rapid quantitatively

# Comparison to Data: Health Output Share



Matches increase qualitatively, but too rapid quantitatively

# Comparison to Data: Price of Health Goods



•  $p\frac{q_{ht}}{a_{t}}$ : Right qualitatively, misses acceleration of prices in data.

# Decomposition of Life Expectancy at Age 20



Growing contribution of modern health after 2<sup>nd</sup> kickoff

# Outline

Introduction

Facts

#### Economic Model

Households

Firms

Equilibrium

#### **Calibration and Results**

#### Conclusion

### Conclusion: What We Have

Endogenous growth model with a health sector generating...

- ... kick-off of adult life expectancy and (later) modern medicine
- ... positive trend of health spending share
- ... positive trend of health employment, R&D spending shares
- ... increasing relative price of health
- …continuously increasing life-expectancy in 20-th century

# Conclusion: Next Step and Outlook

- Quantitative evaluation: reforms to health care & public R&D policies
- Model elements:
  - Life Cycle Model
  - Explicit model of health accumulation and frailty
  - consumption, savings, health investment, & endogenous retirement
  - household heterogeneity in life expectancy
  - Private & social insurance: health insurance & social security